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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the movie Minority Report, Tom Cruise’s character, Chief John 
Anderton, runs a “Pre-Crime” unit operating out of Washington, D.C. in the 
year 2054. Relying on three “Pre-Cogs” who can sense that a crime will be 
committed, Chief Anderton is convinced that the Pre-Cogs are making the 
nation safer—right up until the moment when the Pre-Cogs predict that 
Anderton himself will be committing murder in the next thirty-six hours. 
Anderton must find out why he’s been identified as a future murderer. The 
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“minority report” referenced in the movie’s title is from the female Pre-Cog, 
who occasionally dissents from the other two Pre-Cogs’ crime predictions. The 
movie’s premise—what if we can predict the future risk of legal malpractice 
using data generated by an unlikely source to fuel our predictions?—provides us 
with a nice legal ethics question: What if we could pinpoint specific legal 
malpractice markers before they mature into actual malpractice?2 
The practice of law is evolving at a breathtaking pace—true even 
before COVID-19, but especially true since the pandemic began. Big data, 
advanced technologies, and alternative legal service providers are 
revolutionizing how legal services are undertaken, delivered, priced, and 
evaluated.3 Until recently, legal services have been almost entirely 
 
2 We use the terms “malpractice,” “legal malpractice,” “legal professional liability,” and 
“LPL” interchangeably as the same concept. We also use the terms “insurance company,” 
“insurer,” and “carrier” interchangeably as the same concept.  
3 See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, ‘Fundamental Shift’ is Transforming the Delivery of Legal 
Services, New Report Concludes, ABA J. (Jan. 6, 2020, 2:10 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/fundamental-shift-is-transforming-the-delivery-of-legal-services-report-concludes 
[https://perma.cc/3378-XYC9] (discussing the effect of technology on legal practice); 
Michele Gorman, Despite Hype, AI Still Hasn’t Caught on with Most Attorneys, LAW360 
(Oct. 23, 2019, 7:38 PM), www.law360.com/articles/1212702/despite-hype-ai-still-hasn-t-
caught-on-with-most-attorneys (noting that attorneys say that artificial intelligence and other 
tools are “creating a generational shift” in legal service delivery); Aebra Coe, Data Science 
No Longer a Luxury for Modern Law Practices, LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2019, 4:07 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/1105413/data-science-no-longer-a-luxury-for-modern-law-
practices (arguing that “lawyers will need to know the basics of data analytics and statistics” 
to be competitive); Nancy B. Rapoport & Joseph R. Tiano, Jr., Leveraging Legal Analytics 
and Spend Data as a Law Firm Self-Governance Tool, 13 J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 
171, 172–75 (2019) (discussing how firms are leveraging data to create a business 
development advantage); Nancy B. Rapoport & Joseph R. Tiano, Jr., Legal Analytics, Social 
Science, and Legal Fees: Reimagining “Legal Spend” Decisions in an Evolving Industry, 35 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1269, 1269 (2019) [hereinafter Rapoport & Tiano, Jr., Legal Analytics] 
(discussing how data analytics tools are affecting legal service delivery); Aebra Coe, Why 
More Law Firms Are Moving to the Cloud, LAW360 (Mar. 20, 2017, 3:33 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/903164/why-more-law-firms-are-moving-to-the-cloud (de-
scribing increased cloud usage at law firms); Julie Sobowale, How Artificial Intelligence Is 
Transforming the Legal Profession, ABA J. (Apr. 1, 2016, 12:10 AM), https://www. 
abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_artificial_intelligence_is_transforming_the_legal_pr
ofession [https://perma.cc/GPG7-QXER] (reporting that lawyers say artificial intelligence is 
changing how they think, work, and interact with clients); John S. Dzienkowski, The Future 
of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service Providers to Corporate Clients, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2995, 2995–96, 3017 (2014) (discussing the effect of   innovative legal services models); 
John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence 
Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3041, 3041, 3056 (2014) (arguing that information technology has begun to disrupt lawyers’ 
market power in providing legal services); Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal 
Prediction—or—How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven 
Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 910–11, 949 (2013) (positing that legal 
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consultative, qualitative, and tailored in nature. Statistics and automation 
used to take a back seat to experience and human effort. In today’s legal 
industry, there are two distinct offerings of “legal solutions”: (1) the practice 
of law itself, and (2) the business of delivering legal services.4 Clients now 
receive a hybrid qualitative/quantitative service mix where many aspects of 
law can be “mass customized,”5 using innovative artificial intelligence tools to 
automate tasks formerly assigned to junior associates and paraprofessionals 
and providing “bespoke” services on complex issues to those clients who can 
afford them.6 Moreover, the increasing use of legal analytics provided by 
third-party industry innovators can give both law firms and clients new 
perspectives on efficiency and value.7 
These innovations affect how, when, and where attorneys practice 
(e.g., in BigLaw or elsewhere), thus contributing to heightened client 
expectations regarding speed and accuracy in the delivery of legal 
 
information technology will help define the future of the legal services industry). Most of these 
changes are occurring in BigLaw or highly specialized boutiques, but many of the advances in 
artificial intelligence are likely used by lawyers in the other sectors of legal practice as well, from 
solos and small firms to mid-sized firms. 
4 In other words, the pricing of those legal services, which also includes reductions in client bills 
based on negotiations with clients and the overall budgeting process in which law firms engage. 
5 “Mass customization” is defined as “the mass production of individually customized 
products, goods, and services.” Mass Customization, MERRIAM-WEBSTER https://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mass%20customization [https://perma.cc/55YT-RNT6] (last 
visited July 11, 2020). For one of the seminal articles on the application of mass 
customization, see James H. Gilmore & B. Joseph Pine II, The Four Faces of Mass 
Customization, 75 HARV. BUS. REV. 91 (1997). 
6 For a wonderful article discussing the array of legal services options available to a Chief 
Legal Counsel, see Omari Scott Simmons, Chief Legal Officer 5.0, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1741, 1747–49 (2020). Other great articles include Joan C. Williams, Aaron Platt & Jessica 
Lee, Disruptive Innovation: New Models of Legal Practice, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2015); 
McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 3; Dzienkowski, supra note 3. 
7 Among the top disruptors, of course, is Legal Decoder. LEGAL DECODER 
https://www.legaldecoder.com/ [https://perma.cc/6566-H2QZ] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020).   
(Yes, we’re both biased in favor of Legal Decoder.) Legal Decoder’s mission is to 
revolutionize the way that legal services are priced and economically evaluated. Legal 
Decoder’s software is capable of programmatically running the entire analysis of the 
Malpractice Markers. See discussion infra Section IV.B. Other companies that provide data 
about “legal spend” include LUMEN LEGAL, http://www.lumenlegal.com/legal-spend-
analytics [https://perma.cc/VX7Q-KQ8B] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020); LegalVIEW 
Analytics, WOLTERS KLUWER, https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/solutions/enterprise-
legal-management/legalview-analytics) [https://perma.cc/BS5L-HSYF] (last visited Nov. 
21, 2020); and BODHALA, (http://www.bodhala.com/legal-spend-analytics) [https:// 
perma.cc/Q9RW-JKJK] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020). 
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services.8 Today, law is unabashedly a business in which clients expect 
lawyers to deliver legal services better, faster, and cheaper, all without 
sacrificing quality. The old days of having only two degrees of service 
delivery freedom—fast and good, fast and cheap, slow and good—are gone. In 
addition, clients have become ultra cost-conscious, often characterizing much of 
the work performed by lawyers as routine, commoditized, and undeserving of 
ever-increasing hourly rates. The practice of law is no longer a genteel profession 
in which attorneys are viewed as skilled artisans, trusted advisors, and deep 
thinkers, who can take all the time needed to deliver a (near-)perfect work 
product. Feeling client pressure to be more efficient, legal professionals regularly 
use innovative technologies in order to meet client expectations.9 
When those expectations aren’t met, clients don’t hesitate to sue their 
former attorneys for legal malpractice. For attorneys and malpractice 
insurers, legal malpractice claims can result in massive economic damages, 
resource drains, and reputational harm. Despite significant transformations in 
nearly every other aspect of the legal industry, the approach to preventing, 
predicting, assessing, and resolving malpractice claims hasn’t really changed. 
Malpractice insurers and their law firm clients continue to take an old-
fashioned approach when it comes to legal professional liability (LPL). LPL 
industry experts have confirmed that most legal malpractice insurers aren’t 
yet leveraging advancements in technology and legal analytics to predict risk 
areas.10 Instead, LPL carriers primarily react to actual events or use the broad 
brush of simple demographics to set rates. Consequently, the “all-in” 
malpractice costs for insurers and law firms continue to escalate, even though 
 
8 For a discussion of how chief legal officers can leverage new developments to keep legal 
fees reasonable, see generally Nancy B. Rapoport, Using General Counsel to Set the Tone 
for Work in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1727 (2020); Nancy B. Rapoport, 
Client-Focused Management of Expectations for Legal Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 28 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 39 (2020). 
9 These innovative technologies include contract generation and review software; legal 
analytics tools; practice management platforms; document management systems; 
timekeeping and billing software; and eDiscovery tools, among others. For over two decades, 
Robert Ambrogi, an attorney and journalist, has been writing about the LegalTech industry 
on his website. LAWSITES, https://www.lawsitesblog.com/ [https://perma.cc/XD86-7LXD] 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2020). That website is an excellent resource to keep abreast of 
innovations in the LegalTech industry. 
10 As part of our research for this article, we conducted hour-long interviews with over a 
dozen executives directly involved in the LPL industry as LPL carrier executives, 
underwriting experts, claims executives, LPL brokers and consultants, and risk management 
partners at law firms. Special thanks go to David Bell, Steve Couch, Henry Dinger, Joe 
McCarthy, Douglas Richmond, Todd C. Scott, and Sharon Stuart, along with a few other 
interviewees who wished to remain anonymous.  
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risk and costs should be decreasing.11 This is the wrong result for everyone 
directly or peripherally involved in the legal industry and, more specifically, 
the wrong result for the LPL industry as a whole.12 
This paper posits that a data-driven approach to legal professional 
liability will reduce the overall cost of malpractice claims, thus helping law 
firms to recognize potential pressure points before those intimations of 
problems become full-blown blisters. Part I analyzes the underpinnings of 
malpractice claims. Part II discusses how malpractice insurers and their law 
firm clients have historically assessed, underwritten, and resolved 
malpractice claims. Part III explains why historical malpractice metrics fall 
short. And Part IV proposes a new data-driven analytic schema by which 
malpractice claims might be predicted, managed, assessed, and resolved.  
 
 
 
11 To make matters worse for LPL carriers, many LPL industry experts indicated that the 
underwriting profit margin for LPL carriers is razor-thin, often as low as five percent (5.0%), 
leaving them with the challenge of having to rely predominantly on investment income to 
generate their desired economic results. See supra note 10. 
12 See, e.g., Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance Claims Grow in Severity, Complexity, 
Cost, INS. J. (May 31, 2019), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2019/05/ 
31/527978.htm [https://perma.cc/8K5V-VUDB] (discussing the growing complexity and 
higher costs associated with defending legal malpractice claims); HERBERT M. KRITZER & 
NEIL VIDMAR, WHEN LAWYERS SCREW UP IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE VICTIMS 71 (2018) (showing, in Figure 4.1, that the annual claim rate for large 
firms is approximately 7.5 out of every 1,000 lawyers); id. at 121–22 (estimating that large firms 
spend $570 million per year to pay and defend malpractice claims). As Kritzer and Vidmar note, 
ALAS [Attorneys Liability Assurance Society] offers its members policies 
with per-claim limits starting at $10 million and going as high as $75 
million. Premiums are not experienced based. Rather, all members of 
ALAS pay the same rate per lawyer for a policy with a specific limit and 
a specific “self-insured retention” (SIR). A[ ] SIR operates similarly to a 
deductible with one key difference. The insured must expend the SIR 
before the insurer steps in and starts to pay; in a contract with a deductible, 
the norm in the solo/small firm market, the insurer usually will recoup the 
deductible from the insured after paying the claim and the defense costs. 
The per-claim SIR with ALAS ranges from a minimum of $175,000 up to 
a maximum of $5 million. In 2015, a policy with the lowest claim limit 
had a premium of $5,075 per lawyer if the SIR was $175,000’ the premium 
declined to $3,128 with a $1 million SIR and to $1,450 with a $5 million 
SIR. The comparable figures for a policy with a claim limit of $50 million 
were $9,398, $6,444, and $4,128, respectively; for a policy with the 
maximum claim limit of $75 million, the figures were $10,664, $7,594, 
and $5,225, respectively. 
Id. at 45. See generally Attorneys Liability Assurance Society, https://alas.com 
[https://perma.cc/EYZ5-FDMK] (last visited Nov. 27, 2020). 
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I. UNDERPINNINGS OF MALPRACTICE ACTIONS 
 
As with virtually every other aspect of the law, the basis for a legal 
malpractice claim requires the application of law to a set of facts. We will 
first discuss the types of errors and fact patterns giving rise to a legal 
malpractice claim and then address how several theories of law determine 
malpractice liability. 
 
A. Legal Malpractice Errors 
 
An infinite number of fact patterns could form the factual 
underpinnings of a legal malpractice claim. We’ve distilled all of these fact 
patterns into three types of errors indicating breaches of duties owed to clients 
by their lawyers. First, there are substantive legal errors, such as giving 
incorrect legal advice, doing exceptionally sloppy work (like missing a 
statute of limitations or other important deadline), and engaging in other 
actions that fall below the standard of care. Most substantive legal errors will 
reflect on an attorney’s competence and diligence. Next, there are 
administrative legal errors, which include failing to identify and resolve 
conflicts of interest, faulty withdrawal from representation, failure to transfer 
client files, and improper commingling of funds. Administrative errors 
usually relate to poor workflow processes at law firms, insufficient client 
communications, and ineffective internal controls and governance measures. 
Worst of all are intentional wrongdoings, such as billing fraud, 
misappropriation of client funds, frivolous litigation, and outright dishonesty, 
all of which will trigger malpractice claims or worse. 
 
B. Malpractice Theories of Liability 
 
 In countless cases and treatises, courts and legal experts have 
explained the complicated principles of professional ethics and legal 
professional liability, and we’re not going to rehash them here.13 For purposes 
of this article, we’ll offer a highly simplified and abbreviated version of the 
elements of a legal malpractice action under several different legal theories. 
Whether a claim is grounded in professional negligence, the law of 
fiduciaries, or contract law, there are four fundamental elements required to 
establish a prima facie malpractice action:14 
 
13 For an in-depth discussion of the law of legal professional liability, see RONALD E. 
MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (2020 ed.), a five-volume, 9088-page treatise viewed as the 
leading authority on the topic. 
14 See, e.g., In re 35th & Morgan Dev. Corp., 510 B.R. 832, 848 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014) (“In 
an action for legal malpractice the plaintiff must plead and prove that: the defendant attorney 
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• Duty Owed. A lawyer-client relationship has been established, giving 
rise to a legal duty owed by the lawyer to the client.15 In nearly every 
jurisdiction, the lawyer-client relationship triggering a lawyer’s duty 
arises when a client seeks legal representation and advice or has formally 
engaged counsel.16 
 
• Violation. Not every error made by a lawyer equates to malpractice. 
There must be a violation of a standard of professional conduct that is 
the baseline for acceptable professional behavior.  
 
• Causation. For a legal malpractice claim to be valid, an aggrieved client 
must prove that the lawyer’s violation or error caused the damages.17 
 
• Damages. An aggrieved client must prove actual damages.18 
 
1. Civil liability for professional negligence 
 
Against this backdrop, it’s important to understand what does and 
doesn’t “count” to establish a standard of care associated with civil liability 
for professional negligence or legal malpractice. A state’s ethics rules provide 
standards for professional discipline by the entity regulating lawyer 
conduct.19 The violation of a state’s ethics rules can’t form the basis of a 
 
owed the plaintiff a duty of due care arising from the attorney-client relationship; that the 
defendant breached that duty; and that as a proximate result, the plaintiff suffered injury in 
the form of actual damages. Even if negligence on the part of the attorney is established, no action 
will lie against the attorney unless that negligence proximately caused damage to the client.”) 
(quoting Governmental Interinsurance Exch. v. Judge, 850 N.E.2d 183, 187 (Ill. 2006)).  
15 1 MALLEN, supra note 13, § 8:12. 
16 Id. Note that there are some ethical duties owed to potential clients. See MODEL RULES OF 
PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“Even when no client-lawyer relationship 
ensues, a lawyer who has learned information from a prospective client shall not use or reveal 
that information . . . .”). Other duties flow to former clients. See, e.g., id. r. 1.9 (discussing 
how lawyers and their present or former firms are constrained in using information about 
former clients). 
17 See 1 MALLEN, supra note 13, § 8:20 (“A basic tenet of any cause of action, no matter the 
legal theory, is that the alleged wrongful conduct of the attorney must be a cause of the 
plaintiff’s injury.”). 
18 See 3 id. § 21:1 (“Although damages are an essential element of a cause of action for 
legal malpractice, there are jurisdictional differences about whether nominal damages will 
suffice. If actual damages are required, the courts agree that the fact of damage cannot be 
left to speculation.”). 
19 See, e.g., NEV. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0A(c) (2019) (“Failure to comply with an 
obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary 
process.”); id. r. 1.0A(d) (“Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action 
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client’s malpractice action: State ethics rules only relate to the state’s own 
ability to discipline those licensed to practice in the jurisdiction. A state’s 
licensing authority can reprimand, suspend, or even disbar a lawyer who has 
violated the ethics rules.20 Even though a violation of the state’s ethics rules 
doesn’t give a plaintiff a free pass for winning a malpractice suit, a violation 
of the ethics rules “may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of 
conduct” as they provide industry accepted evidence of the standard of care.21 
 
2. Breach of fiduciary duty22  
 
Not only may a lawyer be disciplined for a violation of the ethics rules 
or sued for negligence, but she may also be sued for a breach of her fiduciary 
duty to her client. As CJS explains:  
The relationship of client and attorney is one of trust, 
binding an attorney to the utmost good faith in fair dealing 
with the client and obligating the attorney to discharge that 
trust with complete fairness, honor, honesty, loyalty, and 
fidelity. The nature of the relationship between attorney and 
client is highly fiduciary as it consists of a very delicate, 
 
against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has 
been breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other 
nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The Rules 
are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct 
through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. 
Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing 
parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer’s self-
assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, 
does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to 
seek enforcement of the Rule. Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct 
by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable 
standard of conduct.”) For a more general version of the ethics rules, see the guidance of the 
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
20 See, e.g., Ethics FAQs, ST. BAR OF NEV., https://www.nvbar.org/member-services-
3895/ethics-discipline/ethics-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/9NHP-KMNU] (last visited Nov. 22, 
2020) (listing forms of discipline that Nevada lawyers face for violating state ethics rules). 
21 NEV. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0A(d) (2019); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. 
[20] (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).  
22 Claims for breach of fiduciary duty closely resemble professional negligence claims, but 
they differ when it comes to procedural requirements (e.g., statutes of limitations) as well as 
available remedies. For instance, “[a] lawyer who has acted with reasonable care is not liable 
in damages for breach of fiduciary duty, but other remedies such as disqualification, 
restitution, and injunctive or declaratory relief may be available.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1998) (emphasis added). As a 
result of the legal distinction between breach of fiduciary duty and professional negligence, 
our proposed “Malpractice Markers,” infra Section IV.C., likewise acknowledges the 
distinction, separating out a unique “Fiduciary Risk” marker. 
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exacting, and confidential character and requires the highest 
degree of fidelity and good faith. The fiduciary duty of an 
attorney extends both to current clients and former clients 
and is broader in scope than a cause of action for legal 
malpractice. Fiduciary duties created by an attorney-client 
relationship may be breached even though the formal 
representation has ended.23  
In fulfilling a fiduciary duty to her client, an attorney “must serve the client’s 
interests with the utmost loyalty and devotion.”24  
As with malpractice cases, plaintiffs can’t link the violations of the 
ethics rules directly to the violation of the lawyer’s fiduciary duties, but again, 
the ethics rules “may evidence standards of care, and thus, the court may look to 
the rules to determine whether an attorney failed to adhere to a particular 
standard of care and thus breached . . . her fiduciary duty to a client.”25  
 
3. Breach of contract 
 
Add to all of these potential repercussions the garden-variety breach 
of contract claim, which seeks a remedy for a failure to perform in accordance 
with the client-lawyer engagement letter. For example, if the engagement 
letter promises to let the client know of impending budget overruns and the 
lawyer doesn’t do so, that’s a breach of contract.26 If the engagement letter 
promises “best efforts,”27 then attorney sloppiness is a breach as well. Our 
brief survey of the potential consequences for bad lawyer behavior gives you 
a feel for how that misbehavior can lead to devastating consequences, not just 
for the lawyer, but also for her law firm.28  
 
23 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 344 (2020) (footnotes omitted). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 See, e.g., Sample Engagement Letters, S.C. B., www.scbar.org/media/filer_public 
/d6/08/d6083090-d65d-4f6a-b64a-8b08ef359836/sample_engagement_letters_sample_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GG6C-K2X9] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (“We will advise you if fees will 
be significantly higher than this estimate. At such time, you may decide to restrict the scope 
of our efforts or we may make other adjustments.”). 
27 See id. (“You will appreciate we can make no guarantee of a successful conclusion in any 
case. However, the attorneys of this firm will use their best efforts on your behalf.”). 
28 For the quintessential tale of the consequences flowing to a major law firm for the failure 
of one of its partners, see generally Nancy B. Rapoport, The Curious Incident of the Law 
Firm That Did Nothing in the Night-Time, 10 LEGAL ETHICS 98 (2007) (reviewing MILTON 
C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004)). Law 
firms must supervise their attorneys (and their non-attorney staff); see, for example, MODEL 
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1, 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). For an example of a lawsuit 
encompassing, among other things, malpractice, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary 
duty, see Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawsuit Accuses Morrison & Foerster of a ‘Billing Feeding 
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II. BIG DATA AND STATISTICAL SCIENCE IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
 
A. Overview 
 
For decades, the insurance industry has run on internal data generated 
from customer application forms, claims data, emails, and internal notes.29 
Insurers are now mining externally commissioned data from third-party 
research organizations and are finding a treasure trove of information from 
the public record (bankruptcies, judgments, foreclosures, and criminal 
records) and even from social media sources in order to generate new 
underwriting metrics.30 Without question, unstructured raw data abounds. A 
daily challenge for insurers is transforming raw data into structured data and, 
ultimately, into viable business intelligence. 
One can add to the volume and variety of primary data that are 
actively sought by insurers even more data that are being passively captured 
via telematics,31 monitoring equipment, and other technological applications; 
indeed, the possibilities for data usage in the insurance industry seem endless. 
In most lines of coverage, insurers have been leveraging data to better 
understand consumer behavior, to anticipate preferences and risks, to 
expedite the application process, to improve claims management and 
 
Frenzy,’ A.B.A. J. (Feb. 20, 2019, 12:05 PM), www.abajournal.com/news/article/suit-
accuses-morrison-foerster-of-a-billing-feeding-frenzy [https://perma.cc/24M4-59VL]. 
29 Ins. Nexus, External Data in Insurance – Part 1, REUTERS EVENTS: INS., https://www. 
reutersevents.com/insurance/analytics/external-data-insurance-part-1 [https://perma.cc/VP2R-
5Z9S] (last visited Nov. 22, 2020). 
30 See, e.g., Herb Weisbaum, Data Mining Is Now Used to Set Insurance Rates; Critics Cry 
Foul, CNBC (Apr. 16, 2014, 11:29 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/16/data-mining-is-now-
used-to-set-insurance-rates-critics-cry-fowl.html [https://perma.cc/26QC-WNG4] (describing 
“price optimization,” which is the insurance industry’s practice of using customer data to 
raise rates for individuals likely to accept a rate increase but not for those who are more likely 
to shop around than to pay a higher rate). 
31 The term  
[t]elematics refers to the use of wireless devices and “black box” 
technologies to transmit data in real time back to an organization. 
Typically, it’s used in the context of automobiles, whereby installed or 
after-factory boxes collect and transmit data on vehicle use, maintenance 
requirements or automotive servicing. Telematics can also provide real-
time information on air bag deployments or car crashes and locate stolen 
vehicles by using GPS technology. In addition, telematics can serve as the 
platform for usage-based insurance, pay-per-use insurance, pay as you 
drive (PAYD) insurance, pay how you drive (PHYD) programs for fleet 
insurance, or teen driving programs for retail business.  
Telematics, GARTNER: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY GLOSSARY, https://www.gartner.com/ 
en/information-technology/glossary/telematics [https://perma.cc/6APQ-VJPH] (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2020).  
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“market[] effectiveness by tailoring products to individual preferences,”32 
and to reduce claims leakage, which is the difference between what a carrier 
should have spent on a claim if that claim had been managed efficiently and 
what the carrier actually spent resolving the claim.33 
“Big data” provides insurers with invaluable insights into all facets of 
their business operations. From an operational perspective, data are helping 
insurers identify trends, anomalies, competitive edges, and business 
challenges so that insurance executives can craft strategic plans and implement 
cutting-edge operational tactics for their organizations.34 In many coverage 
lines, insurers have leveraged big data in their underwriting operations to more 
accurately price and incentivize risk-reducing behaviors. For example, insurers 
calculate smoker vs. non-smoker rates for health and life insurance, offer “safe 
driver” discounts for auto insurance premiums, and reduce homeowner’s 
insurance premiums for residences with a connected home security system.35 
As a result of its commitment to data, the insurance industry benefits from 
improved profitability via more accurately assessed risk.36 
The big data trend shows no signs of slowing in the insurance 
industry. The insurance industry spent roughly $2.4 billion annually on 
gathering and using big data in 2018, and that amount is expected to 
 
32 Big Data, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS: CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RSCH. (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_big_data.htm [https://perma.cc/N7KW-9WYX]. 
33 VIJAI GANESH, INFOSYS, BIG DATA ANALYTICS: IT’S TRANSFORMATIONAL IMPACT ON THE 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 2 (2018), www.infosys.com/industries/insurance/white-papers/doc 
uments/big-data-analytics.pdf [https://perma.cc/M38E-FWZ5]. 
34 Christopher Henry, How Big Data Is Changing the Insurance Industry, MEDIUM (Mar. 12, 
2020), https://medium.com/@chrishtopher.henry_38679/how-big-data-is-changing-the-insur 
ance-industry-293bb243a820 [https://perma.cc/UT4M-3V9Z]. 
35 Barbara Marquand, Life Insurance for Smokers vs. Quitters: When Are You a Nonsmoker?, 
NERDWALLET (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/insurance/life-insurance-
nonsmoker/ [https://perma.cc/92U3-NPTF]; Paul Stenquist, Letting Your Insurer Ride 
Shotgun, for a Discounted Rate, N.Y. TIMES,  (July 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
07/16/business/car-insurance-app-discounts.html [https://perma.cc/T9R6-NT3K]; Insurance 
Discounts for Using Alarm Systems to Protect Your Home, SAFETY.COM (Jan. 13, 2020), 
https://www.safety.com/insurance-discounts-for-using-alarm-systems-to-protect-your-home/ 
[https://perma.cc/9DFU-KR6A].  
36 As our friend Bernie Burk put it,  
In the ordinary course of competition . . . that ought to translate to a very 
significant degree to lower rates for lower-risk insureds. And . . . better 
understanding in the legal industry can lead to better risk management, in 
the sense of policies and practices that should tend to reduce the number, 
severity, and cost of claims. How much of those savings end up in the 
insurers’ pockets vs. the insureds’ pockets is one of those things [that] 
economists debate long after everyone else has dozed off. 
Comment from Bernard A. Burk, Consultant, to authors on an earlier draft of this 
article (Sept. 28, 2020) (on file with authors). 
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skyrocket to $3.6 billion by next year.37 For anyone doubting the effect of big 
data on the insurance industry, the emergence of an entire vertical segment in 
the information technology industry called “InsurTech” affirms that 
innovative technologies, particularly data analytics tools, will be a 
cornerstone of the insurance industry for years to come. 38 The appetite for 
data in the insurance industry is insatiable.  
 
B. Amplifying Demographic Data with Behavioral Data 
 
Policy holder segmentation is one of the most fundamental practices 
in the insurance underwriting world. It enables insurers to accurately and 
cost-effectively gauge an insured’s risk profile.39 Until just recently, 
segmentation methodologies used by insurance underwriters have focused on 
demographic factors (age, gender, marital status, income, geography, and so 
forth) as the stalwart metrics guiding the evaluation of underwriting risk.40 
Demographic data was the best (and only) way for insurers to establish a risk 
profile. But as most insurers will attest, it is not uncommon for insureds who 
have identical demographic criteria to behave in a radically different manner. 
Such behavioral differences do not invalidate the use of demographics for 
underwriting purposes. Demographics are an excellent starting point. But the 
limitations, variables, and unpredictability inherently associated with relying 
solely on demographics have underscored the need for insurers to find a more 
sophisticated solution, using underwriting factors tailored to specific current 
and potential policyholders. Today, underwriting experts understand the 
limitations of demographic segmentation and seek best-in-class solutions. 
Enter behavioral data.41 Behavioral data are data generated by, or in 
response to, an individual’s activities, reactions, preferences, and habits.42 By 
uncovering how individuals act and why, behavioral data enables insurers to 
predict more accurately how their policyholders are likely to act in the future 
and to assess the risks posed by those behaviors. Sources of behavioral data 
 
37 Big Data, supra note 32. 
38 This is InsurTech’s Moment. Will Insurers Seize the Opportunity?, PWC, 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/financial-services/library/insurtech-innovation.html 
[https://perma.cc/85XT-LAQS] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020). 
39 DELOITTE, ADVANCED ANALYTICS AND THE ART OF UNDERWRITING: TRANSFORMING THE 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 4 (2007), www.the-digital-insurer.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ 
326-Deloitte_FSI_AdvancedAnalytics.pdf [https://perma.cc/9984-BVS2]. 
40 MARK CARR, SOUTH STREET STRATEGY GROUP & AMY MODINI, CHADWICK MARTIN BAILEY, 
A NEW APPROACH TO SEGMENTATION FOR THE CHANGING INSURANCE INDUSTRY 2 (2012), 
https://www.cmbinfo.com/cmb-cms/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/HealthDoc_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GEE6-CGVW]. 
41 ERIC BENJAMIN SEUFERT, FREEMIUM ECONOMICS: LEVERAGING ANALYTICS AND USER 
SEGMENTATION TO DRIVE REVENUE 47–82 (Andrea Dierna ed., 2014). 
42 Shane Greenstein, Behind the Buzz of Behavioral Data, 35 IEEE MICRO 88, 88 (2015). 
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include websites, mobile devices, software systems, marketing automation 
systems, medical equipment, call centers, help desks, and billing systems. 
Behavioral data can be generated from individuals, businesses, or individuals 
within a business, but behavioral data can always be tied back to a single end-
user and is typically captured as an “event.” For underwriting purposes, 
insurers now supplement historical, internal demographic data with 
behavioral data from external, technologically enabled data sources. 
Behavioral data can be used to generate better coverage solutions because 
insurers have better predictive insights into the relative risk of underwriting 
an individual policy in the future policy term. Many lines of coverage already 
are capturing and leveraging behavior data in ways never before imagined.  
 
C. The Auto Insurance Paradigm – Behavioral Data Comes to the Forefront 
 
To acquaint readers with a close analog for how behavioral data, 
fueled by innovative technology, could be used in the legal malpractice 
context, let’s examine the underwriting process for automobile insurance and 
how it’s evolved. It used to be that automobile insurance and the related 
premiums were largely based on simple factors.43 Historically, the 
information used by auto insurers to gauge underwriting risk included only 
the application information, driver demographics, driver history, and vehicle 
history.44 This information was fed into the insurer’s rating system to produce 
an underwriting rating or score, and then the insurance company would use 
those variables to determine insurability and the size of the premium.45 
Even as we have moved into the big data era, the information 
embodying “legacy” auto insurance underwriting factors surely remains 
relevant; however, innovative technologies, like telematics,46 that surface 
behavioral trends have revolutionized the underwriting criteria for auto 
 
43 Cf. Josh Anish, 11 Things Car Insurance Companies Don’t Want You to Know, 
MARKETWATCH (Nov. 2, 2019, 1:42 PM), www.marketwatch.com/story/11-things-car-
insurance-companies-dont-want-you-to-know-2019-10-29 [https://perma.cc/4DXZ-GB3M] 
(demonstrating that legacy driver-based criteria have expanded to include prior claims, credit 
score, marital status, job status, and education level).   
44 Insurance Experts Explain the Main Demographic Factors That Influence Car Insurance 
Rates, BUS. INSIDER: MKTS. INSIDER (Nov. 19, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://markets. 
businessinsider.com/news/stocks/insurance-experts-explain-the-main-demographic-factors-
that-influence-car-insurance-rates-1027738423 [https://perma.cc/PH48-YQW3]; Insider 
Information: How Insurance Companies Measure Risk, INSURANCECOMPANIES.COM, 
https://www.insurancecompanies.com/insider-information-how-insurance-companies-measure- 
risk/ [https://perma.cc/L8KU-6TZP] (last visited Nov. 22, 2020).    
45 Insurance Experts Explain, supra note 44.  
46 See Big Data, supra note 32 (discussing the use of telematics). 
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insurance.47 For the past decade or so, our vehicles have been running on a 
plethora of advanced sensors and other data-collecting and data-transmitting 
technologies that allow for real-time communications and data sharing. 
Advanced technologies have transformed what used to be a moving bucket 
of bolts into a data sponge. These new telematic technologies monitor and 
report on an automobile’s mechanical performance, augmenting significantly 
the “vehicle history” part of the underwriting equation.48 More important for 
purposes of auto insurance underwriting, premiums, and claims, these 
technologies also monitor driver behavior, driving patterns, and automobile 
usage trends.49 Sensors capture a car’s speed, brake application, airbag 
deployment, seatbelt use, steering angles, A/V usage, and similar factors.50 The 
captured data is not just limited to vehicle performance but includes personal 
information, too, such as driver weight, music tastes, and places visited, 
including fast-food drive-throughs.51 Rather than relying solely on 
demographic data (application forms and driving history), insurers can 
leverage behavioral data by “watching” a driver operate a vehicle for a little bit 
and determining an underwriting score based upon the driver’s actual driving 
history.52 Then, in a more fulsome underwriting exercise, insurers can take a 
single driver’s metrics and compare an individual’s driving behavior with a 
larger pool of data to correlate behavior and risk. Newfangled underwriting 
 
47 See, e.g., Stenquist, supra note 35 (describing telematics as “like the Elf on the Shelf, but 
for car insurance. Call it the mole on the console.”). 
48 How Telematics May Help You Save Money on Car Insurance, ALLSTATE (last updated Aug. 
2020), https://www.allstate.com/tr/car-insurance/telematics-device.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
KSA8-U3BZ]; How Does Telematics Work?, VERIZON CONNECT (last updated Oct. 29, 
2019), https://www.verizonconnect.com/resources/article/what-is-telematics/ [https://perma.cc/ 
P9NV-HRJU]. 
49 How Telematics May Help You, supra note 48. 
50 Stenquist, supra note 35; How Does Telematics Work?, supra note 48. 
51 Geoffrey A. Fowler, What Does Your Car Know About You? We Hacked a Chevy to Find 
Out, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/ 
12/17/what-does-your-car-know-about-you-we-hacked-chevy-find-out/ [https://perma.cc/ 
J3AA-56D3]; Stephanie Voelker, Debunking the Top 10 Vehicle Tracking Myths, GEOTAB 
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.geotab.com/blog/top-myths-misconceptions-related-to-telematics/ 
[https://perma-cc/M8MT-LH84]. A car can generate 20 to 200 gigabytes a day, according to 
some estimates. The data trove in the hands of car makers could be worth as much as $750 
billion by 2030, the consulting firm McKinsey has estimated. But consumer groups, 
aftermarket repair shops and privacy advocates say the data belongs to the car’s owners and 
the information should be subject to data privacy laws. Stephen Gossett, IoT in Vehicles: A 
Brief Overview, BUILT IN (Dec. 13, 2019), builtin.com/internet-things/iot-in-vehicles 
[https://perma.cc/H7TQ-R3FJ]. 
52 Snapshot Privacy Statement, PROGRESSIVE (last updated July 21, 2020), 
www.progressive.com/support/legal/snapshot-privacy-statement/ [https://perma.cc/7UPF-
8EEF]; Privacy Policy, ROOT INS. (last updated Apr. 1, 2020), www.joinroot.com/privacy-
policy [https://perma.cc/QZ24-7ZQZ]. 
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scores emanating out of driving behavior, mileage, and other metrics are 
realities in this highly innovative arena.53 
In the context of auto insurance, insurers have augmented and 
improved the “old school” approach with new technologies that unearth 
behavioral trends. It stands to reason that it is only a matter of time before the 
insurance industry implements the “connected car” paradigm across all lines 
of business. Like the auto insurance line of coverage, underwriting metrics 
are becoming significantly more individualized, sophisticated, and data-
driven in property and casualty insurance, health insurance, and life 
insurance, among others. We think that LPL coverage is a prime area for 
mimicking the approach seen in auto insurance underwriting, but the LPL 
area is sorely lagging behind underwriting advances in other insurance lines. 
We don’t just think that it’s a good business idea to bring LPL into the modern 
era; we think that it’s vital to the survival of the LPL industry and its lawyer-
customers. In the next sections, we trace the current state of play in the legal 
malpractice underwriting scene and explain how smart data analytics tools 
can drive better LPL underwriting metrics by individualizing an attorney’s 
malpractice risk profile. 
 
D. Data Usage in the LPL Segment  
 
Iris: Sometimes in order to see the light, you 
have to risk the dark. 
 
— MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002)54 
 
Given that the insurance industry uses ultra-sophisticated data 
analytics to inform most of its business lines, it boggles our minds that industry 
hasn’t brought a sophisticated level of behavioral data analysis into the mix to 
illuminate the legal malpractice line of business. We’re not willing to go so far 
as to say that legal malpractice underwriting metrics are stuck entirely in the 
 
53 In the vehicle insurance context, driving-related data captured via telematics is far from 
perfect but far better than nothing. For instance, a driver with a lead foot may not excessively 
exceed the speed limit during the week because she may live in a congested metropolitan 
area with a ton of traffic and never has a chance to drive fast during weekday rush hour like 
she does on weekends. A smoothing effect may blur her weekend speeding habit. Likewise, 
telematics cannot meaningfully account for the senior partner who stops at the club for a 
drink or two after work before heading home but, miraculously, never had his inexcusable 
behavior behind the wheel of a car detected (yet . . . ) by telematic means. Without question, 
the partner’s behavior, in additional to being illegal, surely results in greater risk of motor 
vehicle collisions but could remain largely undetected. So, data analytics in the insurance 
realm is not a 100% accurate silver bullet, but it surely goes a long way to point insurers in 
the right direction when it comes to gauging underwriting risk posed by its insured. 
54 MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002). 
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dark ages or that the legacy demographic metrics can’t shed some light on legal 
malpractice risk, but the approach that LPL underwriters are using today is akin 
to the underwriting approach in auto insurance lines from the late 1900s. Much 
like in the auto insurance context, the “real” underwriting risk is mostly 
derived from behavioral data, not demographic data. 
Indeed, the metrics used to calculate legal malpractice underwriting 
risk, assess claims exposure, and settle LPL claims seem shockingly 
unsophisticated. Fewer than a dozen factors are considered, and that paucity 
of data affords legal malpractice insurance little more than a perfunctory 
evaluation of risk.55 For insurers, the baseline for evaluating a law firm’s 
underwriting risk starts with an application that captures primarily, if not 
exclusively, demographic data. 56 The LPL application57 captures little to no 
meaningful behavioral data, and in the big-data age, that gap strikes us as 
woefully inadequate. 
None of the factors used to evaluate legal malpractice risk is per se 
wrong, and all of them should continue to be used. But as we discuss below, 
these factors have inherent predictive limitations, allowing for only broad 
conjecture. Indeed, this demographic data is a poor proxy for behavioral data, 
borne of guesswork and presumptions about behavioral patterns. We discuss 
below the demographic data being used by LPL insurers and why we think 
that such data have limited predictive value.  
 
1. Practice area  
 
As we studied how LPL insurers envisage risk factors, we discovered 
that they maintain a fairly consistent categorization of areas of practice that 
tend to produce the most claims. The riskiest practice areas are mergers and 
acquisitions, trusts and estates, tax opinions, patent law, securities, plaintiff-
side medical malpractice, environmental law, and real estate.58 The industry 
 
55 Susan Saab Fortney, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Surviving the Perfect Storm, 28 J. 
LEGAL PRO. 41, 58–59 (2004). 
56 NANCY R. KORNEGAY & DAVID H. BROWN, PURCHASING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
INSURANCE 3 (2011), http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/10357/137641_01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J2UA-DF9F]. 
57 Per our interviews, LPL industry experts have said that the typical application can be as 
little as five pages or as much as forty pages long. Several of them also indicated that LPL 
carriers struggle with striking a balance between wanting to know everything in the LPL 
application and causing applicants to want to walk away because of too many questions. 
58 Based on interviews; see supra note 10. See also MAGGIE WELK, KIMBERLE WILLIAMS & 
CRAIG GREUEL, ARGONAUT INS. CO., ARGO PRO PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY SERFF FILING 3 
(2017) (SERFF Tracking Number ARGN-130932892) (explaining that Argo’s insurance 
rates for attorneys are based in part on an “Area of Practice Factor” that can increase rates 
based on the frequency and severity of claims generally arising out of that practice area); 
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clearly views the type of practice area as relevant to legal malpractice risk, 
particularly when claims are predicated on substantive errors.59 At first blush, 
one might be inclined to conclude that the “riskiest” areas of law are the most 
sophisticated, most complicated, and most prone to misapprehension of the 
law. This conclusion, though aspirational, simply is not true. 
A lawyer’s natural hope is that LPL insurers look, in proper context, 
to the competence and behavior of an insured attorney when evaluating her 
legal malpractice risk profile.60 They want legal malpractice risks and 
premiums to be based on actual competence and specifically observed 
behaviors, not on behavioral risk that is inferred from generalized 
information with no inherent predictive value. In reality, the degree of LPL 
risk ascribed to “high-risk” practice areas has little to do with legal 
complexity or professional competence required by a discipline of law. 
Indeed, risk ascribed to a practice area is based upon the industry-wide 
number of claims made in that area of law and the severity of those claims. 
There are certain fields of law where clients have proven to be more inclined 
to make a malpractice claim and seek comparatively higher damages than in 
other practice areas.61  
 
News Release, Ames & Gough,  Rising U.S. Legal Malpractice Claims Continue to Plague 
Law Firms (May 20, 2020), https://www.amesgough.com/sites/default/files/A%26G%20 
News%20Release%20-%202020%20LPLI%20Claims%20Survey%20-%205-20-20.pdf 
[https://perma-cc/AQ2U-SDBQ] (describing that, based on a survey of lawyers’ professional 
liability claims, business transactions and corporate and securities were the two practice areas 
experiencing the largest number of legal malpractice claims in 2019).  
59 According to several LPL industry experts, the risk profile of “boutique” law firms that 
specialize in a single area of practice is considerably lower than the risk profile for general 
practice law firms. When different attorneys in a single law firm practice in multiple areas 
of law, LPL carriers typically evaluate each “pocket” of practice area practitioners during 
the underwriting process. They are asking whether those practice groups represent a high 
combined level of expertise or are comprised of “dabblers” who are new entrants into the 
particular practice area. Similarly, a lawyer with a broad breadth of practice areas might be 
a prototypical “small town lawyer” or a dabbler looking for a more remunerative practice 
area. LPL carriers are now also grappling with the complicated issue of how to assign risk to 
attorneys who engage in a multi-jurisdictional practice. 
60 Almost universally, the LPL industry experts shared the view that their lawyer-insureds 
have only a superficial understanding of the LPL evaluation process.  
61 Top Practice Areas for Lawyers’ Malpractice Claims, INS. J. (June 28, 2018) 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2018/06/28/493458.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
V3DJ-YG67]. As an example of severity of claims in a “high risk” area of law, consider the 
purchase and sale of a warehouse. Recording a deed of transfer or mortgage on the land 
records is far from complex. However, if a mistake is made during recording, that mistake 
more often than not jeopardizes the entire value sought by a client buying or selling the 
property and it’s not a mistake easily overlooked by the client given the magnitude of the 
harm. The substantive error did not materialize because of legal complexity. However, it did 
trigger a claim mainly because the error completely subverted a client’s objective and the 
resultant harm was catastrophic. 
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Additionally, the “area of law” factor assumes that attorneys always 
stay in their lane, practicing only within their area of expertise. That 
assumption is flat-out wrong. Dabbling in an area of law that falls outside of 
an attorney’s core competence gives rise to a significant number of claims 
and can run afoul of a lawyer’s professional duties.62 According to the 
American Bar Association’s “Profile of Legal Malpractice Claims: 2012–
2015,” over 60% of all malpractice claims pertain to a practice area in which 
the accused attorney works for less than 20% of his or her time.63 To put a 
finer point on matters, only about 7% of all legal malpractice claims are made 
against attorneys who practice in a single area of the law.64 When attorneys 
dabble in non-core areas of law, the behavioral tendencies of those dabblers 
will skew underwriting data—to the detriment of attorneys who do stay in 
their lane as a specialized practitioner and to the detriment of those LPL 
insurers who insure them. Moreover, using the area of law as a factor is less 
meaningful when the legal malpractice results not from substantive errors but 
from administrative errors or intentionally wrongful behavior.65 Those two 
categories account for one third of all malpractice claims.66 
 
2. Firm size  
 
Unlike other professions, whose annual malpractice premiums are 
determined based on the firm’s annual revenue, malpractice premiums for 
law firms are calculated on a per-lawyer basis and depend on the number of 
attorneys in the firm.67 There is some variation among insurers, but typically 
law firms are segmented into anywhere between five and nine size 
categories.68 Some LPL carriers even evaluate the lawyer-to-support staff 
 
62 American Bar Association Rules and every state impose a duty that “a lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” MODEL 
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
63 William F. McDevitt, Dabbling: A Dangerous Practice Even for Accomplished Attorneys, 
LAW.COM (June 9, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almID/120 
2759657347/?slreturn=20201011113526 [https://perma.cc/BR6R-Z7Y7]. 
64 Id. 
65 ABA STANDING COMM’N ON LAWYERS’ PRO. LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL PRACTICE CLAIMS 
2012–2015, at 18 (2016) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM’N].  
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., WELK ET AL., supra note 58, at 1 (making the point that Argo’s insurance rates 
for attorneys are based in part on the “Size of Firm Factor”). 
68 See, e.g., ARCH INS. CO., LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY PROGRAM: GENERAL 
RATING RULES 4, 6 (2014) (segmenting firms into one of nine size categories); LAWGOLD, 
RATING GUIDELINES LAWGOLD LPL (ARIZONA) 4 (2010) (segmenting firms into one of six 
size categories).  
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ratio in an attempt to gain further insights into a firm’s risk profile.69 Solo 
practitioners and small firms (up to ten attorneys) account for over 75% of 
malpractice claims and thus pay the highest premiums per capita.70 LPL 
insurers infer certain law firm and attorney behaviors based on law firm size. 
For instance, the LPL carrier metrics assume that larger law firms with more 
resources have better internal risk management controls71 and more reliable 
administrative procedures than do smaller firms.72 LPL insurers also assume 
that larger law firms will have attorneys whose expertise covers a sweeping 
range of practice areas, thereby reducing the instances of lawyers dabbling 
outside their core practice areas.73 LPL insurers further assume that the 
behaviors of the overwhelming majority of lawyers in an Am Law 400 law 
firm risk mimic each other or, at least, do not vary significantly. Moreover, 
LPL insurers assume that larger firms are less risky because fewer claims are 
made against them than are made against smaller firms. In the eyes of the 
actuaries at LPL insurers, these size-based assumptions and the concomitant 
inferences about lawyer behavior are “true enough” to rely on firm size as an 
underwriting metric.74  
The assumptions may be correct or mostly correct, but they also have 
their limitations because the assumption that larger organizations pose a 
lower risk profile is far from unassailable. Certainly, larger law firms have 
the resources to implement greater risk controls, but firm politics and 
economics—and organizational bureaucracy—can undermine even the best 
risk mitigation initiatives. The “competence of large numbers” assumption 
also seems to be misguided. With throngs of people working on a high 
volume of matters and lots of task handoffs from professional to professional, 
mistakes inevitably happen. Indeed, it is just as possible that having more 
 
69 Per our interviews, the LPL experts indicated that a well-trained support staff is viewed 
positively in the LPL underwriting process (presumably because of their ability to curtail 
administrative risk) until the attorney-to-support staff ratio crosses a certain threshold, at 
which point LPL carriers presume that excessive support staff personnel are poorly trained 
and/or inadequately supervised.  
70 ABA STANDING COMM’N, supra note 65, at 14.  
71 In reading an earlier draft, Nancy’s friend Randy Gordon pointed out that risk management 
can, itself, create risk. As Randy explains, “every risk management form that is supposed to 
get filled out and/or signed by the client is evidence of malpractice when it doesn’t get filled 
out or returned.” E-mail from Randy Gordon, Partner, Barnes & Thornburg, to Nancy B. 
Rapoport, (Sept. 7, 2020, 6:52 PM) (on file with authors). 
72 Randy Gordon also observed that the compensation systems in large law firms can cause 
“sometimes perverse incentives.” Id. We agree wholeheartedly, and one of our future studies 
will compare the behavior in firms that use lockstep partner compensation with the behavior 
in firms that use an “eat what you kill” compensation system. 
73 As Bernie Burk reminded us, even BigLaw lawyers can dabble. They just have more 
people at the firm to help them think through issues that “dabblers” might face. Comment 
from Bernie Burk, supra note 36.  
74 Information gathered from author interviews. See supra note 10. 
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people in the equation creates a greater risk of malpractice errors rather than 
acting as a check and balance against malpractice.75 The resources of larger 
law firms allow them to tamp down or mute problems so that they don’t 
register on the radar screens of LPL insurers (or, more specifically, the 
insurers’ actuaries). Finally, many solo practitioners are uninsured, which 
could mean that those solo practitioners who pose no malpractice risk are not 
counted in the actuarial analysis.76 Simply put, the assumptions underlying 
the “size of firm” factor as an underwriting metric may not be as 
determinative as LPL insurers have assumed.  
 
3. Geography 
 
The state in which a law firm practices, as well as different locations 
within the state, contributes to a firm’s malpractice risk profile.77 Geography 
per se is a red herring because the real factor measured is the hourly rate that 
a firm charges for services rendered. Statistics show that firms that charge 
higher rates (usually in metro areas) typically see claims with a higher dollar 
value, but this correlation doesn’t pertain to the frequency of claims made or 
the underlying basis for the claim.78 In other words, LPL insurers are not 
focusing on the error/violation or causation elements of a malpractice claim 
but instead are focusing on the damages element.79 We sympathize, because 
damages affect the magnitude of the payouts, but preventing the malpractice 
in the first place will also affect the magnitude of the payout. We see little, if 
 
75 It makes logical sense that more professionals in a law firm handling more matters 
increases the risk of something going wrong. With ethical rules imposing a duty of 
supervision and vicarious liability on law firm partners for the misdeeds and professional 
malpractice of colleagues, legal malpractice underwriters for larger law firms are keen to 
know how throngs of associates are supervised and whether a management committee or 
peer-review system exist. These types of management control measures are a baby step in 
the right direction towards the use of behavioral, not just demographic, data. 
76 See Scott R. Schaffer & Kyle P. Barrett, Bare Naked Lawyers: Practicing Without LPL 
Insurance May Leave Attorneys Overexposed, AON ATTORNEYS ADVANTAGE, https:// 
www.attorneys-advantage.com/Risk-Management/Bare-Naked-Lawyers [https://perma.cc/ 
R6FJ-E9TS] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (stating that, for example, “a 2005 Texas survey 
found that . . . 63% of solo practitioners were uninsured”); Susan Humiston, Practicing Law 
Without Liability Insurance, MINN. ST. B. ASS’N: BENCH & B. MINN.  https:// 
www.mnbar.org/resources/publications/bench-bar/columns/2019/10/02/practicing-law-with 
out-liability-insurance [https://perma.cc/95B6-T6DJ] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (“Illinois 
estimates that as many as 40 percent of solo lawyers are uninsured. In a 2017 survey in 
Washington, 28 percent of solo practitioners reported being uninsured.”). 
77 See, e.g., WELK ET AL., supra note 58 (stating that professional liability insurance rates 
will vary based on state).  
78 Information gathered from author interviews. See supra note 10. 
79 An attorney practicing in Dallas, Texas is going to pay more than an attorney practicing in 
rural Nebraska. Some states, like New York, have multiple underwriting territories, with law 
firms in New York City paying more than attorneys in upstate New York. 
           Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [December 2020 
 
   
 
288 
any, correlation between geography and those behaviors that are likely to 
trigger a legal malpractice claim.  
 
4. Claims history/step rating 
 
“Claims made”80 history is widely viewed as the most accurate 
predictor of future claims.81 Although claims history has undertones of 
behavioral data, it is almost entirely a quantitative criterion using, in most 
instances, a multivariate analysis. Typically, a “claim” will include any event 
reported to any insurance company with an incurred loss amount of $5,001 
or more.82 Claims history is segmented primarily by firm size,83 number of 
claims over the past five years,84 and total dollar amounts of all claims over 
the past five years.85 Each of these claims history factors is ascribed a value 
 
80 An “occurrence” policy provides coverage for alleged incidents that occurred during the 
policy year irrespective of when the claim is reported to the carrier. A “claims-made” policy 
provides coverage for an incident that occurred during the policy period and was reported as 
a claim when the policy was in effect. When a claims-made policy becomes effective, the 
effective date, also known as the retroactive date, becomes a permanent part of the claims-
made policy and remains the same each year the policy is renewed. A claims-made policy, 
when renewed, covers claims that come in during the policy year for incidents that occurred 
on or after the retroactive date. This is how an attorney can be covered for prior acts or 
incidents that are several years old. 
81 Past and pending claims can affect not only the cost of a firm’s policy, but also eligibility 
for coverage. 
82 “Incurred amount” includes reserve and payment for indemnity and expenses. When a 
claim has been reported but the claims reserve is unknown, five-twenty five percent of the 
demand amount may be used as the best estimate for the claim value. See, e.g., ARCH INS. 
CO., supra note 68, at 4 (“For purposes of the additional charge, a ‘claim(s)’ [sic] means: 
any claim reported to any insurance company with an incurred loss amount of $5,001 or 
more. Incurred amount includes reserve and payment for indemnity and expenses.”); 
LAWGOLD, supra note 68, at 4 (“For the purposes of the adjustment, losses will only be 
considered ‘claims’ if: i) loss and/or expense payments have been made in excess of $5,000; 
or ii) an insurer has established a claim file and carries an open reserve in excess of $5,000.”).  
83 See discussion supra note 68 and accompanying text.  
84 See ARCH INS. CO., supra note 68, at 4; LAWGOLD, supra note 68, at 4. Certain LPL 
insurers flatly deny coverage to firms with over five prior claims in the past five years. 
85 See ARCH INS. CO. supra note 68, at 5; LAWGOLD, supra note 68, at 4. One insurer has 
categorized claims liability into the following categories: 
Severe Account has already experienced at least one loss with total case 
reported losses (including defense expenses) exceeding deductible by 
more than $100,000. 
Significant There is a possibility of payout exceeding the deductible by 
$10,000 but not by more than $100,000. 
Material While there are established reserves for this account and payout 
may exceed the deductible, it is not anticipated to exceed the deductible by 
more than $10,000. 
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that may increase or decrease an LPL carrier’s so-called base rate. For 
example, a law firm that has had no claims made against it may receive a 
“claim-free” credit that decreases the base rate. Conversely, a law firm that 
has been the subject of many legal malpractice claims will see its base rate 
increased by a multiple based on “claims made.”86 A final quantitative 
wrinkle that arises in the context of the claim history is the “step rating” 
attributed to a lawyer.87 A lawyer’s step rating recognizes that newly minted 
attorneys generally have fewer clients and fewer prior acts, as compared to 
more seasoned attorneys. This makes the “prior acts” risk concomitantly 
lower.88 Typically, an insurance carrier that uses the “step rating” 
methodology offers a reduced rate in the first five or six years of an LPL 
policy, after which time the attorney malpractice profile has reached maturity, 
ripening into the “typical” risk profile.89  
A considerable amount of quantitative analysis goes into “claims 
history,” but we think that “claims” are misrepresented when the insurer 
relies solely on demographic data. First, there are unmade claims that could 
have or should have been made based on actual attorney (mis)behavior, but 
that were never counted because clients were unaware of the potential claim.90 
Second, in circumstances in which a client has become aware of a potential 
claim, many clients may choose not to pursue their claim against the law firm. 
Third, in circumstances in which a client has become aware of a potential claim 
and has opted to pursue it, the law firm and client may have agreed to resolve 
 
Minimal There have either been no claims reported or claims reported 
have had no payout or a low possibility of ultimate payout. 
VIRGINIA PUTZU & TONIA BURLEIGH, QBA INSURANCE CORP., LAWYERGUARD SERFF 
FILING Flex-8 (2018) (SERFF Tracking Number QBEC-131630592.) 
86 Even a high number of claims might not mean a high risk of large payouts. One LPL 
industry expert estimated that 75–80% of claims reported by lawyers to LPL carriers ended 
up with no action by the aggrieved party.  
87 In determining how to price the first year of coverage and succeeding renewals, the claims-
made insurers’ actuaries closely monitor statistical data reflecting the lag time between 
occurrences which create liability and the reporting of claims arising out of those 
occurrences. In addition, they study the impact of various economic factors on the value of 
claims during this lag time. From this data, they draw conclusions about the number of years 
likely to elapse before all of the claims arising out of any one “occurrence year” are reported 
and settled and the ultimate cost of defending and settling those claims. Then, they use these 
conclusions to establish rating factors to determine the cost of a claims-made policy as it 
renews each year. These rating factors are commonly referred to as “step rates” because they 
evolve in a stair-step pattern. See, e.g., How Legal Malpractice Insurance is Priced, OKLA. 
ATT’YS MUTUAL INS. CO., https://oamic.com/step-ratings/ [https://perma.cc/NCQ9-LCGN] 
(last visited June 17, 2020) (discussing what step ratings are and how they work).  
88 On the other hand, the risk of a newer lawyer actually committing malpractice is likely to 
be higher. We both made many mistakes at the beginning of our careers. 
89 Information gathered from author interviews. See supra note 10. 
90 See supra note 82 (noting that it might not be immediately apparent that there is enough 
value to make a claim due to the concept of “incurred amount”). 
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the claim without putting the LPL carrier on notice. Underreporting of claims 
strikes us as a meaningful limitation on the factor’s accuracy. 
Besides underreporting, claims history does not look to the underlying 
behavior giving rise to the claim. Except for the damages calculation ascribed to 
a claim, the actuarial methodology seems to treat all claims more or less 
identically. That can’t be correct. By ignoring lawyer behavior, the merits 
of a claim, and its factual underpinnings as part of claims history, LPL 
insurers are using a blunt instrument to assess a complex problem when a 
surgical tool that considers behavior in the context of claims history would 
yield better risk assessments. 
 
5. Client roster 
 
A law firm’s client roster can create additional malpractice risk. 
Clients that have unreasonable expectations for an attorney or for the 
outcome of their matter are more likely to make a malpractice claim. Client 
size and sophistication, as well as a client’s proclivity to challenge its law 
firm’s bill, alters the risk profile. Similarly, the number of law firms that have 
been previously employed by the client on the same matter is viewed as a high 
indicator of risk. That factor, we believe, is reasonably accurate, though 
sometimes the frequent switching of firms stems not from client dissatisfaction 
at all, but rather from a client’s desire to keep her lawyer even after her lawyer 
has changed firms. Lateral movement of attorneys from firm to firm is 
commonplace today. It is not clear to us whether the firm turnover calculus 
accounts for a client who follows the same lateral lawyer from firm to firm. 
 
6. Miscellaneous considerations 
 
Malpractice risk is viewed as being higher (or lower) as a result of the 
absence (or presence) of loss-prevention programs, use of risk management 
practices, docket control measures, conflict of interest avoidance policies, 
and law-firm-imposed continuing legal education requirements.91 We agree 
that a systems approach to managing risk is a necessary underpinning, but 
having a good system in place is not the same thing as using that system.92 
Without question, LPL underwriters should continue to use the 
quantitative/demographic factors discussed above as indicia of risk. These 
factors are time-tested, and insurers will affirm that they have meaningful 
 
91 Other factors not related to the risk posed by a lawyer or law firm that affect the cost of a 
policy include policy limits, deductibles, self-retention obligations, and additional claim 
defense expenses paid outside the policy limits.  
92 One of us can’t resist pointing to the “gate fails” of FAIL Blog: CHEEZBURGER: FAIL 
BLOG, https://cheezburger.com/4882611968/security-fail [https://perma.cc/BW7X-SGQ2] 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2020). The other one of us is indulging her here. 
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correlations to risk. That said, we’re in the age of big data and must therefore 
ask: Are there other big-data-driven behavioral metrics that can better 
pinpoint LPL risk and that can be used to augment or even outweigh the 
legacy metrics? We think so.  
 
III. WHY LEGAL MALPRACTICE METRICS NEED TO EVOLVE 
 
Iris: It’s funny how all living organisms are 
alike . . . when the chips are down, when the 
pressure is on, every creature on the face of the 
Earth is interested in one thing and one thing 
only. Its own survival. 
 
— MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002)93 
 
The prior two Parts paint a starkly contrasting picture between the 
sophisticated risk assessment data and metrics used in auto insurance 
underwriting and the rudimentary data and metrics used in LPL underwriting. 
At the risk of stating the obvious,94 overlaying qualitative, behavioral data 
into the underwriting mix has brought auto insurance underwriting into the 
twenty-first century of big data. LPL insurance underwriting, on the other 
hand, seems to be stuck in the twentieth century, with antiquated risk 
assessments using only large-scale quantitative, demographic data.95 For both 
the LPL segment of the insurance industry and for the legal industry as a 
whole, the use of unsophisticated underwriting metrics is a suboptimal 
approach. There are significant business imperatives and competitive drivers 
for both LPL insurers and law firms that should prompt legal malpractice 
insurers to begin to incorporate behavioral data into underwriting guidelines. 
Each segment has been given the mandate by clients to innovate and deliver 
greater client value.96  
In the insurance industry today, customers are the most disruptive 
force.97 The leading insurers have found that their paramount mission must 
 
93 MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002). 
94 Which has never stopped us. 
95 The specifics as to the operational and financial effect of using a combination of 
demographic data and behavioral data across the entire industry as a whole extends well 
beyond the scope of this article. 
96 See e.g., Collaborative Defense for Your Legal Malpractice Claims, ATT’Y PROTECTIVE, 
https://www.attorneyprotective.com/legal-malpractice-claims [https://perma.cc/8KG9-NUCH] 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2020) (providing an example of innovative products in the legal 
malpractice insurance sector). 
97 See JORDI MONTALBO & DAVID RUSH, DELOITTE LLP, A DEMANDING FUTURE: THE FOUR 
TRENDS THAT DEFINE INSURANCE IN 2020, at 3–4 (2019), www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/ 
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be to emphasize policyholders’ needs, preferences, and perceptions in nearly 
all aspects of their business and at every touchpoint throughout the 
customer’s journey. The customer experience must be hyper-personalized 
because buyers of insurance—especially sophisticated, commercial buyers 
such as law firms—have never been more informed, more adept at 
comparative shopping, and more exacting. As we discuss below, hyper-
personalization is now a customer prerequisite to be achieved through 
detailed data analysis, innovation, and modern digital capabilities.  
As ironic as it may seem, the legal industry, which itself has been 
slow to change, is likely to drive the change in LPL underwriting metrics. 
The same pressure that law firms are feeling from their clients will 
undoubtedly funnel down to LPL insurers, who will feel change pressures 
from their own law firm clients. Clients are strongly pushing back on law 
firms with respect to their legal fees. Those legal fees have, in turn, been 
embedded within LPL coverage and rate cost structure. With the clients of 
law firms monitoring fees more closely, it is reasonable to expect law firms 
also to be more cost-conscious when it comes to the fixed cost associated 
with LPL premiums. If a law firm can urge an LPL carrier to use a more 
accurate and hyper-personalized set of underwriting metrics to lessen the 
malpractice risk profile and thus reduce premiums, it does not take a severe 
strain of logic to conclude that law firms will eventually do just that.98  
Financial transparency and clarity have been the rallying cry in the 
legal industry for several decades now. Its value holds true in the LPL 
industry as well. LPL underwriting guidelines and the weighting of the 
factors varies widely from carrier to carrier. Often, the underwriting 
guidelines are not published, and law firms have no way of truly 
understanding those guidelines.99 Understandably, LPL insurers must set the 
price of premiums at a level that compensates them for the risk taken, but also 
at a level that fits within the budget of their law firm customer. Otherwise, 
the law firm will go elsewhere for coverage. Law firms surely deserve better 
guidance and information on how their risk profile is calculated, how they 
can reduce their malpractice risk profile, and how they can use enhanced self-
governance to improve their LPL risk profile. When malpractice 
underwriting guidelines are a black box, risky law firms get lumped in with 
 
Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial-services/deloitte-uk-insurance-trends-2019.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/55JH-YM9X] (describing why customers are the most disruptive force in the insurance 
business). 
98 Especially if the result is more money in partners’ pockets because of the savings on LPL 
insurance premiums, because of fewer claim payouts, and because of improving the risk 
factors overall. 
99 See supra note 60 (“Almost universally, the LPL industry experts shared the view that 
their lawyer-insureds have only a superficial understanding of the LPL evaluation process.”). 
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less-risky law firms, creating a tremendous amount of premium disparity. The 
less risky law firms are subsidizing the behavior of their riskier counterparts. 
But how much data will law firms be willing to give their insurers? 
After all, bad drivers probably don’t want the “mole on the console”100 
exposing their lead feet, their tailgating, or their other bad habits to insurers 
because their rates will go up. Law firms probably don’t want their bad habits 
laid bare to LPL insurers, either. But the risks don’t go away just because 
LPL insurers don’t know about them. And those risks are expensive. 
Reducing the risk of malpractice can save law firms big bucks in the ordinary 
course of business, but especially when a law firm is in a transformative mode 
where, for instance, it is looking to grow attorney headcount, expand into new 
practice areas or geographies, or pursue the next “tier” of clients.101 In this 
regard, consider a law firm with a strategic growth initiative through lateral 
partner acquisitions. For that firm, it would be highly beneficial to know in 
advance how risky the addition of lateral lawyers will be for the firm.102 The 
epic bankruptcy case of Dewey & LeBeouf demonstrated the risk of adding 
laterals whose promises were mere fantasies.103 And then, of course, there are 
the advantages to the clients. 
As law firms are being pressured by clients to use technology and data 
to make the delivery of legal service better, faster, and cheaper, the firms are 
responding by leveraging their knowledge management repositories, 
document management systems, and billing data warehouses to deliver 
service offerings (and even product offerings) that involve mass 
customization and incorporate their clients’ demands for efficiency and 
innovation.104 So, too, will law firms demand this heightened standard from 
providers of LPL coverage. The trickle-down effect will come into play. 
When a law firm is uninsured, underinsured, or overcharged because 
premiums are not based on hyper-personalized malpractice risk factors, then 
 
100 Stenquist, supra note 35. 
101 In just those cases that the two of us have reviewed, we’ve seen exposure in the hundreds 
of thousands of dollars per firm. That’s not chump change. 
102 Some firms are making data-driven choices in terms of adding laterals. In particular, 
Duane Morris has a process for gathering information about a lateral partner’s book of 
business and has a deliberate onboarding plan to integrate lateral partners into the culture of the 
firm. HEIDI K. GARDNER & ANNELENA LOBB, Collaborating for Growth: Duane Morris in a 
Turbulent Legal Sector, HARV. BUS. SCH. CASE STUD. 9-414-022, at 12–13 (July 26, 2013). 
103 For a great read on the Dewey & LeBeouf debacle, see James B. Stewart, The Collapse, 
NEW YORKER (Oct. 7, 2013). 
104 See Caryn Devens, Teppo Felin, Stuart Kauffman & Roger Koppl, The Law and Big Data, 
27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 357, 366 (2017) (describing new client services and tools 
enabled by the use of big data, including tools that “predict legal costs and case outcomes, 
manage data for regulatory compliance, and reduce document review costs”). 
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the law firm’s clients suffer.105 Legal malpractice simply doesn’t stop at the 
law firm level. Real money and the real lives of clients and other third parties 
are at stake when legitimate malpractice claims arise. LPL insurers and law 
firms must acknowledge the reality that their financial interests depend on 
clients who buy legal services. Thus, it is imperative to bring LPL 
underwriting into the twenty-first century. The next Part discusses the new 
data-driven, behavior-driven playbook on how to modernize LPL 
underwriting metrics. 
 
 IV. A NEW DATA-DRIVEN SCHEMA  
 
Iris: The Pre-Cogs are never wrong. But, 
occasionally . . . they do disagree. 
 
— MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002)106 
 
The auto insurance paradigm affirms that powerful new data analytics 
technologies and novel uses of existing technologies enable insurers to 
leverage raw data in ways never before imaginable. Auto insurers use a 
driver’s media system not just as road trip entertainment and the driver’s GPS 
system not just as a map but also as a means to capture and extrapolate driver 
behavior, revolutionizing underwriting risk for every driver seeking auto 
insurance. Auto insurers have realized that raw data captured from disparate 
information sources and a multitude of technologies can be synthesized and 
transformed into meaningful behavioral data, which in turn can highlight 
predictive trends upon which new underwriting metrics can be built. For the 
auto insurance industry, the keys to success have involved recognizing the 
existence of the raw data and having the creative vision to repurpose 
technologies to surface behavioral trends and supplement demographic data. 
Every LPL industry expert that we interviewed craved additional data, 
particularly behavioral data, that could amplify the current criteria used in the 
LPL underwriting process.107 For the LPL insurance industry, the keys to 
success likewise involve leveraging next-generation technology to transform 
raw data into hyper-personalized, behavioral underwriting metrics. This 
section discusses the raw data sources and how that raw data can transform 
the LPL underwriting process. 
 
 
105 For a cash-based business like a law firm, an inflated premium or an underinsured claim 
can have serious ramifications for the financial performance of the law firm. With more 
accurate underwriting metrics come greater fiscal predictability and better operational results 
for law firms. 
106 MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002). 
107 Information gathered from author interviews. See supra note 10. 
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A. The Raw Data 
 
In order to form a good foundation for a next-generation legal 
malpractice underwriting metric, raw data must have three vital qualities: (i) 
raw data should have independent usefulness and validity,108 (ii) raw data 
should be accessible at scale,109 and (iii) raw data should be capable of 
personalization or individualization. Legal billing data fit all of these qualities 
and form much of the foundation for our proposed LPL underwriting schema. 
Each year in the United States alone, lawyers bill clients over $300 
billion.110 Until the early 1990s, when timekeeping and billing software 
became commonplace, law firms sent invoices to clients in paper format.111 
Whether in paper form or submitted through a digital platform, legal invoices 
are rich with raw, semi-structured data. In each invoice, a lawyer reflects, in 
a narrative entry, every task that he or she completes, typically in segments 
of one-tenth of an hour. For anyone who hasn’t had the misfortune of reading 
a legal invoice, here’s a sample time entry: 
 
Date Timekeeper Hours Rate Description Total 
6/9/2020 E. Afferton 2.3 $520  
Analyze US 9,949,302 re: patent 
eligibility (0.4); Draft “Legal 
Analysis” part of Section 101 Alice 
Motion (1.6); Review curriculum 
vitae re: plaintiff's expert (0.3) $1,196.00  
 
This is an example of a “good” invoice line item entry. It is clear, 
concise, (presumably) reflects accurately recorded time, and amply informs 
the client as to what tasks were undertaken and by whom, along with the 
associated cost. Sometimes, line-item narrative descriptions contain much 
more detail, which can be good until they become so wordy that they 
obfuscate what work has actually been performed.112 Other line-item 
narrative descriptions may contain considerably less detail (e.g., “attention to 
file”), to the point that it is impossible to determine what task the attorney 
 
108 We think that independent usefulness and validity is important because these factors 
negate the possibility of bias in the data and further helps to ensure accuracy.  
109 We believe that there is a tipping point where raw data is sufficiently voluminous to 
provide statistical relevance and scientific value. In an industry that generates at least $300 
billion in annual invoice data, volume and accessibility at scale pose no issue.  
110 Industry Revenue of Legal Services in the U.S. from 2011 to 2023, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/forecasts/311177/legal-services-revenue-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/ 
ZF4U-YD4B] (last visited June 17, 2020). 
111 Stephen J. Sturgill, New System Offers Easier and More Exact Billing, NATIONAL L.J., 
October 17, 1994, at 13. Currently, we estimate that over $300 billion in legal billing data is 
processed by law firm time and billing platforms and/or clients’ e-billing platforms. 
112 See infra Section IV.B.2 and Section IV.B.3. 
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performed. Regardless of the clarity and quality of the narrative, every 
invoice line item offers data points that shine a light on what the lawyers and 
other billing professionals are doing. Those data also form the foundation of 
a legal professional’s behavioral patterns.113   
The sample invoice line item entry reflects a total charge of $1,196 
for three items of work performed by E. Afferton, all of which total 2.3 hours. 
This is just a single invoiced time entry for a single client by a single law firm 
timekeeper for, possibly, one-fourth of one timekeeper’s workday.114 These 
data points scale quickly. Right now, there are probably more than 950,000 
attorneys in private practice in the United States115 who are recording and 
billing time in a similar manner in approximately 1,300,000,000 to 
1,500,000,000 line-item entries that can be analyzed every year.116 Most of 
these data can be easily accessed, because timesheets “live” in digital format 
on billing and e-billing platforms. 
This invoice line-item data, which is inherently timekeeper-specific, 
is capable of even further individualization with the assistance of “legal 
spend” data analytics tools. When an individual timekeeper’s professional 
biographical data, such as title, seniority, specialty, educational background, 
prior employers, and so forth are incorporated into an invoice line-item 
analysis, the results are hyper-personalized and powerful.  
In essence, invoice line-item data, coupled with a timekeeper’s 
professional biographical data, is transformed into something akin to the 
DNA of a matter or a legal professional. Out of this invoice-level DNA, 
hyper-personalized behavioral data can become a next-generation LPL 
 
113 As we discuss below in Section IV.B.3, a vague, cryptically written narrative entry, such 
as “Analyze outstanding issues,” “Attention to case strategy and client communications,” or 
“Review file,” informs our proposed LPL underwriting schema because while it sheds no 
light on what a legal professional did, it evidences a potential tendency for sloppy billing 
hygiene practices or even possible Rule 1.5 violations. 
114 At some law firms, 2.3 hours is perhaps 1/6 of a person’s workday. 
115 See Sally Kane, Working in a Private Practice Law Firm, BALANCE CAREERS (Jan. 12, 
2019) https://www.thebalancecareers.com/law-firm-life-2164667 [https://perma.cc/N3PD-
P73P] (“About 75 percent of the 1.3 million-plus licensed attorneys in the U.S. work in 
private practice. Lawyers are considered to work in private practice when they’re part of a 
firm with two or more attorneys, or they have a solo practice.”).  
116 Let’s extrapolate upon this type of invoice line item to understand the potential and power 
of raw billing data, even before it gets programmatically transformed into LPL malpractice 
risk factors. There are several ways to extrapolate. First, let’s calculate based on an “hours 
worked” basis. Based on our industry statistics, the average hours worked per line-item entry 
is 1.1 hours. Assuming an annual 1,800 billable target, each of the 950,000 attorneys in 
private practice will record 1,636 time entries for a total of over 1,500,000,000 narrative 
entries just for the year 2020. If we assume that $300 billion was billed by law firms on an 
hourly basis using line-item invoices where the average value per line item is $225, then 
there are over 1,300,000,000 narrative entries that can be analyzed every year. Calculations 
on industry averages were made using Legal Decoder’s data pool. 
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underwriting metric that examines risk not just by firm size or practice area 
but also by the type of lawsuit or specific transaction, calculates risk with 
respect to an individual or to groups of individuals within a law firm, and ties 
the risk to behavioral patterns. 
 
B. Using Legal Analytics to Calculate Risk: The Six Malpractice Markers 
  
Just as automobile insurers are using behavioral data to supplement 
demographic data, LPL underwriting will benefit by using, as part of its 
underwriting evaluation, our proposed analytic framework, which generates 
behavioral data from legal spend data. We’re basing our proposed 
framework on our own experience, having reviewed millions of line-item 
entries in legal invoices from thousands of law firms and hundreds of 
thousands of legal professionals.  
Although we know that every client matter is different, as are the 
invoices attached to each matter, we can mine a law firm’s billing records for 
patterns of good or bad practices. Our analytic framework is meant to 
augment and amplify existing LPL underwriting standards, not to displace 
them. Indeed, there’s no need for a wholesale change in business process or 
methods. The new behavioral metrics, which we’ll call “malpractice markers,” 
are simply an evolutionary step forward. We understand that this step is a giant 
step, not a baby step, but it’s a necessary step. So, in a “pre-cog” world, what 
does our proposed analytic framework look like? How can insurers mine and 
categorize timesheet entries for predictive risk analysis, to help both the 
malpractice insurers and their insureds identify serious malpractice concerns 
before those concerns mature into full-blown problems?  
We’ve identified the six major malpractice markers, in addition to 
some minor ones, that could help catch potential malpractice before it 
happens. Our proposed analytics framework employs a weighting 
methodology similar to that used by LPL insurers in their existing 
demographic risk factors. 
 
1. Staffing efficiency 
 
Malpractice risk increases when the wrong staffing is used on a project. 
In an optimally functioning legal environment, a legal professional handles 
tasks appropriate for his or her skill set in an industry-benchmarked amount of 
time. There are many dimensions to the concept of staffing efficiency.117 
 
117 As a strategic priority, clients are identifying those tasks that are “commoditizable” in 
order to divert low-value, high-volume work from law firms to lower-cost alternative legal 
services providers. 
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One dimension relates to the seniority of a legal professional. We’ve 
encountered many situations in which the wrong level of professional 
performed a task: for example, senior partners performing tasks below their 
paygrade such as basic legal research118 or the converse, where very junior 
lawyers, without ample supervision, are handling tasks for which they are 
underqualified, such as taking a key 30(b)(6) deposition or negotiating the 
contract language on a complicated tax indemnity provision.119 In the case of the 
senior partner’s research, it raises valid questions: What senior-level work has 
been cast aside in favor of the basic research? If a senior partner handles basic 
research below her paygrade, does that work comport with the Rule 1.5 ethical 
obligation regarding reasonable fees?120 For the junior associate, the lack of 
experience on a sophisticated task clearly implicates the junior lawyer’s (and her 
law firm’s) duty to provide competent representation.121  
We suspect that one of the problems with staffing inefficiency is that 
the partner in charge of a particular representation isn’t monitoring, in real 
time, the cost of who’s doing which tasks. That partner is aware of the 
assignments of various professionals to tasks that must be completed, but 
likely isn’t aware—at least not until the time comes to review the bill—of 
how much time each professional spent on each task. Another dimension of 
staffing efficiency relates to a lawyer dabbling outside of her primary area of 
practice. In almost every imaginable instance, an intellectual property 
attorney should not be handling a living trust document for a high net-worth 
client, and a trusts and estates attorney should not be handling a trademark 
for a start-up technology client. Invoice data, when evaluated with 
sophisticated legal data analytics tools, very quickly surfaces trends where 
attorneys are practicing at the wrong skill set level or in the wrong area of 
law. Both are red flags for LPL risk purposes 
 
118 And the explanations tend to range from “I needed it immediately, and there was no one else 
around” to “I can do it faster.” We absolutely believe that senior partners can do complicated legal 
research faster, but simple research belongs in a junior professional’s wheelhouse. 
119 The failure to assign the right level of work to the right level of lawyer implicates various 
ethics rules, and law firms should have systems for ensuring that the right work goes to the 
right people. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. RESPONSIBILITY r. 5.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) 
(describing the obligations that lawyers who supervise or give orders to other lawyers have 
to ensure that they are conforming to ethical rules, including rules of competence and 
diligence in legal work); see also id. r. 5.2 (stating that lawyers are bound even if they are 
acting at the direction of another, but that they may rely on supervisory lawyers’ reasonable 
interpretations of professional responsibility); id. r. 5.3 (outlining lawyers’ duties to ensure 
that “nonlawyer[s]” are acting ethically and not impeding on lawyers’ ethical obligations).  
120  See id. r. 1.5 (requiring that fees be reasonable with respect to “the experience, reputation, 
and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services” and “the skill requisite to 
perform the legal service properly,” among other factors). 
121 See id. r. 1.1 cmt. 2, cmt. 4 (detailing the basic obligations of competence and noting that “[a] 
newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience” but that 
lawyers should only take matters where competence is obtainable “by reasonable preparation”). 
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2. Workflow efficiency 
 
When clients pay their lawyers by the hour, they expect their lawyers 
to work efficiently without wasted effort, unneeded redundancy in personnel, 
or duplication of work. Inefficiencies in a lawyer’s workflow process quickly 
drive up the cost of legal services. Few things can sour the attorney-client 
relationship as deeply as when a client opens an invoice and sees a legal 
professional doing the same work over and over again (without increased 
efficiency), or multiple lawyers at the same level handling the same task at 
the same time, or throngs of legal professionals attending meetings or 
hearings. Invoices containing these types of inefficiencies leave the client 
questioning outside counsel’s competence and her fiduciary duty of candor, 
and the client starts worrying about whether the professional provided real 
value for each hour billed. 
Although one might think that having multiple tiers of professionals 
working on a task would increase the odds for competent,122 diligent123 
representation, that’s not necessarily true. Having that many bodies requires 
massive coordination in order to avoid problems with client 
communication124 and unreasonably high fees.125 More is not always better, 
and too many professionals assigned to a single workflow matter can create 
confusion and duplication of effort, as different layers of lawyers change 
documents to their preferred individual styles as a draft moves through the 
process.126 As we have said before, in order to dissipate the fear of accidental 
malpractice, lawyers will justify bringing many people to a hearing or a 
meeting, instead of a few. After all, a diversity of experience will best serve 
the client, and having top-notch knowledge on hand will provide better 
service than having to wait for someone back at the office to provide an 
answer to a particular question. Lawyers who work their way up the law firm 
ladder often have very specialized expertise, so having both Partner A (with 
expertise in one area of tax law) and Partner B (with a different expertise in 
tax law) in a meeting will catch any errors and help to come up with a better 
work product. For lawyers who are still working their way through the 
associate ranks, someone more senior must supervise their work. Junior 
Associate X’s research will get supervised by mid-level Associate Y, who 
will do the first draft of a document, only to have senior Associate Z revise 
 
122 Id. r. 1.1.  
123 Id. r. 1.3. 
124 See id. r. 1.4 (describing obligations to keep clients apprised of the status of their legal 
matters, including information necessary to facilitate informed consent and decision-making). 
125 See id. r. 1.5 (noting that reasonable fees consider “the time and labor required” as well 
as “[t]he scope of representation” previously communicated to the client). 
126 As an example, one of us worked with a partner who eschewed middle initials on 
pleadings and spent time editing out those offending initials. 
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the document before handing it to a partner for final revisions. One lawyer in 
an office will pop into another lawyer’s office to get some advice on a matter, 
and those pop-in meetings can span large blocks of time as the professionals 
spitball ideas. “Even filing a pleading that simply states that one party agrees 
with some other party’s position can result in significant billed time if more 
than one professional has to set eyes on the draft before it gets filed.”127 
Ironically, those multiple layers of review ultimately can raise the 
specter of malpractice. After all, it is more efficient to put all of the main 
professionals in a room for a half hour, at the beginning of a representation, 
to communicate what’s going on and who will handle which issues than it is 
to have separate conversations with each professional, and it is more efficient 
to update a workgroup by quick emails (and be allowed to bill for the time 
drafting and reading those emails) than it is to have a series of cascading 
meetings or phone calls. But it is not particularly efficient to schedule all-
hands weekly meetings in which people who don’t need to be at the meeting 
show up because it was too much trouble to cull the invite list. As these 
workflow inefficiencies snowball and intensify, a client’s initial dismay 
becomes frustration; frustration then becomes anger; and anger can quickly 
transform into a malpractice claim. 
All of the activities suggesting workflow inefficiencies (internal 
office conferences, multi-attorney meetings, repeated tasks, and so on) have 
been memorialized in invoice line-item data. When we analyze tens (or 
hundreds) of thousands of line items recorded by a timekeeper or massive 
volumes of line items from innumerable timekeepers, we can surface 
behavioral patterns of workflow inefficiencies. Once surfaced, workflow 
inefficiency trends can be correlated to malpractice risk. 
 
3. Billing hygiene 
 
We define exemplary billing hygiene as “recording clear, concise, 
informative narrative entries linked to the time to complete an individual 
task.”128 The goal of billing hygiene is to explain who did what and for how 
long, so that those paying hourly-rate bills understand the components of the 
legal fees.129 Billing hygiene problems come in a wide variety of flavors, 
 
127 Rapoport & Tiano, Jr., Legal Analytics, supra note 3, at 1276. 
128 Id. at 1293. And, as we said in that article, “[t]he time entry ‘Attention to file—2.1 hours’ 
is unhelpful today and even less helpful tomorrow when trying to price legal services with 
certainty.” Id.; see also Nancy B. Rapoport, ‘‘Nudging” Better Lawyer Behavior: Using 
Default Rules and Incentives to Change Behavior in Law Firms, 4 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL 
MAL. & ETHICS 42, 86 (2014) (“‘[A]ttention to file’ has never told a single client what the 
biller actually did . . . .”). 
129 We’re actually fans of alternative billing methods, and legal analytics can help lawyers 
price fees that are based on metrics other than time multiplied by hourly rate.  
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ranging from vague, cryptically written narrative entries to overly verbose 
narrative entries that obfuscate any inkling of the work performed. “Block-
billing” is the practice of lumping together many tasks spanning several hours 
into a single narrative description. “Round-hour” billing is where a 
statistically improbable number of time entries end in a zero (1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 
etc.). Both block-billing and round-hour billing can eventually trigger a 
client’s ire, which may lead to full-blown malpractice lawsuits. Admittedly, 
there are many reasons that lawyers might not write clear time entries. For 
the types of work for which bills are part of the public record,130 lawyers 
might not want to signal their strategy.131 Moreover, lawyers who don’t 
record their time contemporaneously might not remember in detail what they 
did.132 Those lawyers who are on our side of the bifocal divide might not have 
been trained to provide clear time entries.133  
When billing hygiene is poor, malpractice risk is high. First, poor 
billing hygiene is an indication that a firm’s lawyer and paraprofessional 
training program and its administrative controls are weak. Second, poor 
billing hygiene, even when it results from sloppiness or laziness rather than 
from maliciousness, runs afoul of a lawyer’s Rule 1.5 obligation regarding 
reasonableness of fees and the Rule 8.4(c) obligation not to lie.134 Finally, 
poor billing hygiene will irritate even the most patient and cooperative client, 
and if the lawyer-client relationship deteriorates, poor billing hygiene can 
form the basis for allegations of billing fraud. 
 
4. Institutional governance 
 
Having gotten into the habit of chronicling their workdays in one-
tenth of an hour segments of billable time, most legal professionals also 
account for their non-billable time in a similar manner. Typical categories of 
non-billable activities include pro bono work, business development, firm 
management committees, attorney mentorship, client billing, and continuing 
 
130 Such as fee applications in chapter 11 cases.  
131 See, e.g., Rapoport, supra note 8, at 47, n.33 (2020) (providing sources that describe what 
happened when two law firms—Kirkland & Ellis and Jones Day—scrutinized each other’s 
timesheets as part of a larger skirmish).  
132 We think that making up the entries later violates MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5 
(Am. Bar Ass’n 2020) (regarding fees), r. 1.4 (regarding communications), r. 5.1 (regarding 
supervisory lawyer responsibilities), and r. 8.4(c) (prohibiting “conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”), not to mention the overarching fiduciary 
duty to the client.  
133 Being on our side of the bifocal divide may explain that behavior, but it doesn’t excuse it. 
134 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT. r. 1.5 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2020) (providing that a lawyer 
“shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount”); r. 8.4 (noting that dishonesty and deceit constitute professional misconduct). 
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legal education.135 Insofar as legal professionals capture their tasks and 
activities within these categories of non-billable work, we think that such 
organizational governance/non-billable data can have a major effect on 
malpractice risk.  
If a partner with a $1,500,000 book of business spends fewer than 30 
minutes per month on billing activities, it calls into question whether the 
partner is adequately reviewing the invoices that he or she is sending to 
clients, again bucking up against the ethics rule on the reasonableness of 
fees.136 If an inconsequential amount of non-billable time is recorded to firm 
management committees, which are established to streamline processes and 
mitigate risks, that signals inattention to risk mitigation procedures that can 
reduce malpractice risk. Conversely, where attorneys’ timekeeping records 
indicate that they’ve taught or attended more than the required amount of 
continuing legal education programs, that might bode well for lowering 
malpractice risk.137 Just as with the other malpractice markers, even non-
billable activities can be relevant to LPL underwriting risk.138 
 
5. Matter oversight 
 
Any lawyer charged with overseeing a matter should meet the 
standard of care requiring her to use and manage “people, processes, and 
technology” effectively and efficiently. When an attorney who is the “lead” 
 
135 Most larger law firms set up a “dummy” client/matter account where the client is reflected 
as “non-billable time” and a matter is reflected as “pro bono,” or “management committee 
work” or “CLE.” Contrary to popular opinion, law firms do care what their legal 
professionals are doing when they are not handling billable work. 
136 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT. r. 1.5 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2020) (discussing reasonableness 
of fees).  
137 This assumes the attorneys actually pay attention during the CLEs, rather than just 
multitasking. Sitting in a room playing on one’s smart phone isn’t the same thing as listening 
to the presentation. 
138 Staffing efficiency, workflow efficiency, billing hygiene, and organizational governance 
are certainly our four candidates for the most likely predictors of potential malpractice 
problems, but presumably there are several others as well. For example, we might be able to 
catch those types of behaviors that are typically associated with competency and diligence 
risks by paying attention to how upcoming deadlines get docketed on a lawyer’s calendar. If 
a paralegal dockets an upcoming filing deadline for, say, a summary judgment motion, then 
there should be concomitant calendar entries for starting the drafting process and assembling 
all of the necessary components. If a paralegal dockets an upcoming motion with a filing 
deadline of December 1, and nothing happens on the drafting side until perhaps a few days 
before December 1, then the odds of a well-written, well-argued motion go way down. We 
can conceive of an internal system that nags lawyers to start the drafting process earlier. 
Perhaps a poorly drafted motion won’t rise to the level of malpractice, but why not reduce 
the risk by advance (and automated) planning? 
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attorney on a matter falls short of the mark on her matter-oversight 
responsibilities, that failure poses a malpractice risk. 
In terms of the people component, a properly managed matter should 
be staffed with an appropriate number of legal professionals with the right 
mix of seniority and skill sets, as dictated by the scope and complexity of a 
matter. Understaffing a matter with too few legal professionals can be as 
problematic as overstaffing it. Likewise, staffing a matter with too few senior 
attorneys and too many junior legal professionals can pose a competence 
issue. Using too many “drive-by” billers who breeze in and out of the matter 
and who are not fully committed to it can foster ineffective communication, 
failed accountability, and a shallow understanding of the legal and factual 
issues of the matter. Managing people, particularly legal professionals, is tricky 
for the attorney leading the matter. She must deftly use different people’s skills 
at the right time and in the right manner and scope, all while ensuring effective 
team communications with minimal waste and redundancy. At bottom, poor 
personnel management increases malpractice risk.  
Designing and managing a well-thought-through process is equally 
important when it comes to matter oversight. Without a good process, things 
simply can fall through the cracks. For example, a faulty process will cause 
professionals to miss deadlines or do sloppy, rushed work.  
In the current tech-enabled world, the effective use of technology in 
a matter is critical to good matter oversight. In fact, 38 state bar associations 
have indicated that part of a lawyer’s duty of competence includes a duty of 
technological competence.139 Lead attorneys on a matter need know to how 
and when to use case management technologies, virtual data rooms, 
eDiscovery tools, and legal research platforms. No longer is technological 
competence a role solely for the information technology (IT) department, 
knowledge management experts, or librarians. These tech skills must be 
arrows in the lead attorney’s quiver. If a lead attorney can’t draw back the 
bow, or the arrows consistently fly wide of the mark, these shortcomings can 
materialize into a significant malpractice risk. 
When invoice data for a particular matter is reconstructed using 
advanced legal spend data analytics tools, it is tantamount to the genetic 
roadmap for that matter: people, process and technology can be examined in 
a multi-dimensional analysis. It is possible to identify appropriate 
partner/associate leverage ratios, transient timekeepers, matter advancement, 
 
139 See id. r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (emphasis added) (“To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a 
lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and 
risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and 
comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.”); 
see also Tech Competence, LAWSITES https://www.lawsitesblog.com/tech-competence 
[https://perma.cc/TW99-QUQE] (last visited Nov. 23, 2020) (depicting the states that 
recognize a lawyer’s duty to maintain technological competence). 
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task allocations and flow, communications patterns, and technology usage. 
It’s then easy to compare those metrics on a single matter against comparable 
matters on an industry-wide basis to establish the relevant standard of care 
and related matter oversight markers. 
 
6. Fiduciary risk 
 
Every lawyer owes a fiduciary duty to her client.140 At all times, a 
lawyer must use her professional skills and energy to act in her client’s best 
interest and to disclose any interest—economic or otherwise—that could 
conflict with her client’s interest. Lawyers must adhere to the duty of loyalty, 
the duty of confidentiality, the duty of competence, and the duty to 
communicate. A proven breach of any of these duties will likely trigger 
malpractice liability. 
As we’ve studied invoice data across multiple cases, we’ve 
discovered that the “fiduciary risk” malpractice marker requires an evaluation 
of not just what happened based on invoice data, but also what didn’t happen. 
An analysis of a lawyer’s non-billable time entry data could surface times 
when she engages in activities that are harbingers of malpractice, such as 
interactions with her law firm’s risk management partner(s) or state bar 
officials; legal research on ethics issues; or communications putting a carrier 
on notice. In theory, some of these activities will evidence a fiduciary duty 
breach. The absence of certain categories of activities in invoice data, such 
as a paucity of attorney/client communications, will also raise legitimate 
questions on whether a lawyer is discharging her fiduciary duties properly. 
 
C. Creating the LPL Malpractice Risk Score 
 
Rufus Riley: [to Agatha] Are you reading my 
mind right now? 
John Anderton: Get up. 
 
140 Some lines of jurisprudence surrounding a lawyer’s fiduciary duty include only the duty 
of loyalty and the duty of confidentiality as comprising a lawyer’s fiduciary duty whereas 
other lines also include the duty of competence and duty to communicate. See, e.g., Bank of 
Hartford, Inc. v. Bultron, NO. SP-H-9296-65684, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3551, at *20–
21 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 1992) (describing the duties of an attorney as “competence, 
loyalty, confidentiality and communication”). We acknowledge that aspects of our Fiduciary 
Risk marker could be viewed as overlapping with aspects of the other five markers, much 
like a breach of fiduciary duty action can overlap with actions under other theories of 
liability. The duty of competence and duty to communicate are subsumed by another 
malpractice marker. Accordingly, the “Fiduciary Risk” marker centers on the duty of loyalty 
and duty of confidentiality. 
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Rufus Riley: [to Agatha] I’m sorry for 
whatever I’m going to do and I swear I didn’t 
do any of that stuff that I did. 
 
— MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002)141 
 
We know that there is a sufficient quantum of valuable data that can 
be analyzed to show legal professional behavioral patterns. We also know 
that there are legal data analytics tools that can analyze and categorize the 
legal spend data in a manner that surfaces behavioral trends. No longer are 
LPL actuaries relegated to generalizations, inferences, and conjecture when 
it comes to behavioral data. Behavioral data can allow lawyers and their LPL 
insurers to forecast, in a pre-cog-like manner, malpractice. 
Out of the complex stew of LPL application data, LPL claims data, 
invoice data, biographical data, and LPL actuarial analyses, we think that 
there should emerge an LPL malpractice behavioral scoring metric. Today’s 
technology easily can analyze and synthesize terabytes (or even petabytes or 
exabytes) of complex data and transform the data into a lawyer-by-lawyer, 
simple, individualized/hyper-personalized LPL Malpractice Risk Score, akin 
to an A.M. Best rating, FICO score, Moody’s rating, or similar industry-
accepted standard. 
With advanced data analytics tools, legal invoice data can be analyzed 
on a line-item-by-line-item basis. When a line item contains one or more data 
points that tie to one or more of the six malpractice markers, that line item 
can be flagged and assigned to a malpractice marker category. When this 
flagging and assignment exercise is done at scale, evidence of LPL behavioral 
risk naturally follows. The law firm, or the attorney herself, or both could 
monitor the Malpractice Risk Score over time, with the hope of improvement, 
in the same way that people now monitor their credit scores. Moreover, the 
Malpractice Risk Score could be combined with the existing demographic 
data to amplify existing LPL underwriting guidelines: The Malpractice Risk 
Score could be compared against peers; the score could even be rolled up 
with data from other professionals in the same firm to provide an overall firm 
score. Simply put, the Malpractice Risk Score, which transforms an attorney’s 
own time entries into behavioral data, brings twenty-first century big-data 
insights to legacy LPL underwriting metrics that came from the late 1900s.142 
 
141 MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002). 
142 Our intrepid research assistant, Joshua Nelson, asked us an important question while he 
was helping us with this article: Wouldn’t law firms, knowing what comprised the 
Malpractice Risk Score, game the system to keep their perceived risk down? That’s 
absolutely a possibility: After all, law schools game the U.S. NEWS rankings all the time. 
See, e.g., Darren Bush & Jessica Peterson, Jukin’ the Stats: The Gaming of Law School 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The legal industry and the insurance industry, particularly the LPL 
Insurance segment, can experience a renaissance by using behavioral data 
and our Malpractice Risk Score. Real malpractice risk can be individualized 
so that the less risky insureds don’t wind up subsidizing their higher-risk 
counterparts. LPL insurers can develop new coverage options that protect 
more lawyers (and more risks) at a more affordable price, and those insurers 
could predict malpractice risk with greater accuracy. Most important, 
catching potential risk early allows a professional to find ways to reduce that 
risk, thereby reducing the likelihood and severity of actual malpractice 
claims. Risk prevention measures can be tailored to the risky behaviors of 
individual legal professionals. Underwriting costs and claim exposure and 
severity should decrease, in part because aggrieved clients will be able to 
point to concrete metrics to support their legitimate claims and in part because 
professionals with good systems and habits in place should be able to 
leverage the metrics to avoid or refute frivolous malpractice claims. Much   
 
 
Rankings and How to Stop It, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2013) (discussing pressure on 
law schools to “juke the stats” to gain a competitive advantage); Nancy B. Rapoport, 
Managing U.S. News & World Report—The Enron Way, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 423, 423 n.1 
(2013) (providing examples of data misrepresentation and manipulation at Illinois Law, 
Villanova, and the University of St. Thomas); Alex Wellen, The $8.78 Million Maneuver, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/us/education/the-878-
million-maneuver.html [https://perma.cc/8CUG-ZC9N] (describing the odd incentives and 
choices posed to law schools as a result of the importance of U.S. News & World Report 
rankings). We’re of two minds about Josh’s question: We think that some of the gaming that 
goes on is wasteful (for example, the glossy brochures that law schools mail—or used to 
mail, at least—touting how great they are in time for the voting for U.S. News’s reputational 
scores). These brochures are known colloquially as “law porn.” See, e.g., Doug Litowitz, 
Law Porn and its Discontents, 6 CRIT: CRITICAL LEGAL STUD. J. 14, 15 (2012) (“‘Law porn’ 
is an epithet that refers to professional-looking, glossy publications commissioned by law 
schools . . . often attributed to attempts by law school administrators to influence the U.S. 
News & World Report annual ranking of law schools.”). We can also point to the almost 
fanatical scrutiny of LSATs and undergraduate GPAs that law schools use to manipulate the 
25th and 75th percentiles of those two factors. But we also think that the reason that many 
law schools game the rankings relates to how little the rankings reflect actual differences 
among law schools. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Ratings, Not Rankings: Why U.S. News & 
World Report Shouldn’t Want to Be Compared to Time and Newsweek—or The New Yorker, 
60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1099 (1999) (describing portions of the U.S. News ranking system as a 
“dartboard” approach or as a “glorified coin toss at best”); see also id. at 1101 & 1101 n.17 
(suggesting that U.S. News could also rank law schools by faculty height—or inverse height—
but that ranking wouldn’t reflect quality, either). If we’re right that the Malpractice Risk Score 
reflects actual risk, then the gaming actually lowers risk, which is a good thing. If we’re wrong, 
though, then we’d need to titrate the score until it more accurately reflects risk. 
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like their counterparts in the auto insurance lines, behavioral data promises 
to be the next-generation differentiator for LPL insurers. LPL insurers that 
leverage behavioral data will flourish; those that fail to leverage behavior data 
will do so at their peril. 
 
